The security of computers is at risk because of information leaking through the system's physical outputs like power, temperature and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Through advanced methods of signal measurement and analysis, attackers have compromised the security of many systems, recovering sensitive and personal data. Countermeasures that have been proposed demand new hardware and unfortunately, cannot protect the billions of devices today.
Introduction
There is an urgent need to secure our computing systems against the growing number of cyberattack surfaces. An important class of these attacks are those that utilize the physical outputs of a system like its power, temperature and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. These outputs are correlated with system activity, and this relationship is exploited by attackers to recover sensitive information [22, 53] .
Many computing systems ranging from mobile devices to multicore servers in the cloud are vulnerable to physical side channel attacks [24, 26, 29, 46, 48, 52] . Through advanced methods of signal measurement and analysis, attackers can identify many details like the bits of a cryptographic key [22] , keystrokes and password lengths [46] , and personal data like location, browser and camera activity [24, 29, 48] .
Many defenses against physical side channels have been proposed, which aim to keep the physical signals constant or noisy [7, 15, 22, 37, 41, 49, 50] . However, all these techniques require new hardware and unfortunately, billions of systems today are left vulnerable. Trusted execution environments such as Intel SGX [28] or ARM TrustZone [6] cannot "contain" physical signals and are ineffective to stop information leaking through them [10, 13, 26] .
A defense must be forged against physical side channels at the Operating System (OS) layer to easily protect existing systems. The defense should mask application-induced changes to power, rendering signal analysis futile. This can prevent many exploits that analyze application behavior at the millisecond-scale or longer, such as those in [24, 46] . Obfuscating power also removes leakage through temperature and EM signals because they are directly related to a computer's power consumption [13, 14, 26] .
The first challenge in developing an OS-level defense is the lack of configurable system inputs that can effectively change power. Processor Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is an input supported by nearly all mainstream processors [4, 5, 9, 35, 36, 42] . However, DVFS levels are only a few and the achievable range of power values depends on the application -compute-intensive phases have higher values of power and show bigger changes with DVFS while it is the opposite for IO/memory boundapplications. Injecting idle cycles in the system [23, 43] is another input but this can only reduce power and not increase it.
The second and most important challenge is to develop the algorithm for masking information leakage. This is hard because applications vary widely in their activity profile and in how they respond to system inputs. Attempts to maintain constant power, insert noise into power signals or randomize DVFS levels have been unsuccessful [24, 34, 52] . As application activity changes are unpredictable, power changes becomes unavoidable. Moreover, randomizing DVFS levels only adds noise but does not mask application activity [34, 52] . The defense algorithm must intelligently respond to dynamic conditions to effectively prevent information leakage.
In this work, we propose Maya, a defense architecture at the OS-level that intelligently morphs a computer's power. With Maya, power measurements have patterns that appear to carry activity information but are unrelated to the application in reality. To achieve this, Maya uses a Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO) controller from robust control theory [40] . This controller can change many system inputs so that the outputs like power are kept close to certain target levels assigned for that output. By changing these targets, the outputs can be made to appear in any desired form. Maya generates these targets to make the outputs carry false activity. Maya uses "elastic" applications that can effectively change their power activity as additional inputs over DVFS.
The use of robust control theory enables Maya to work for many types of applications. Robust controllers can reliably keep outputs close to their targets even when runtime conditions change unpredictably. The elastic applications allow Maya to work effectively at the OS level by serving as additional inputs. We implement Maya on a multicore machine and analyze its effectiveness. Maya can be implemented in existing OS's or processor firmwares with ease. The novelty and specific contributions of this work are:
1. Maya, a defense system to reduce information leakage through power. To the best of our knowledge, Maya is the first OS-level defense against physical side channels. 2. The first application of MIMO robust control theory for side-channel defense. 3. The use of "elastic" applications to serve as configurable inputs to change power in existing systems. 4. Implementing Maya on two different hardware platforms and a detailed evaluation showing its effectiveness.
2 Background and Motivation 2.1 Power, Temperature and Electromagnetic Side channels Power, temperature and Electromagnetic (EM) emissions are an important class of physical side channels and carry significant information about the execution. Examples of attacks using these channels include recovering the full encryption key from a cryptosystem [21] , identifying the running application, login requests and the length of passwords on a commodity smartphone [46] , and inferring the characters typed by a smartphone user [24] .
All power analysis attacks rely on the principle that the dynamic power of a computing system is directly proportional to the hardware switching activity. Since this activity varies across instructions, groups of instructions and application tasks, they all leave distinct power traces [24, 39, 44, 46] . Consequently, by analyzing the power signal from a computer, many details about the execution can be deduced.
Temperature and EM emissions are also directly related to a computer's power consumption and techniques to analyze them are similar [13, 14, 26] . Although temperature changes at a slower rate than power, it is quite useful to attack multicores. Most multicores today do not provide per-core power measurements but have per-core temperature sensors [4, 5, 9, 35, 36, 42] . The temperature of a core is affected by the temperature of its neighbors due to heat propagation. Therefore, a task can measure the temperature of its own core to infer the temperature of its neighbors, and consequent, their power and activity.
Attacking with Physical Sidechannels
An attack with physical side channels begins with signal measurements. This can be obtained from the system through special measurement devices [22] , unprivileged OS and hardware counters [1, 36] , or remote antennas that measure EM emissions [16, 17] . In cloud systems, an application can use the thermal coupling between cores to infer the temperature profile of a co-located application [26] . Some methods use malicious measurement hardware like USB charging stations [48] , smart batteries [24] , or co-processing chips and IP modules [38] .
After measuring the signals, attackers examine the phase behavior and location of peaks in the signal over time, and its spectrum after a Fourier Transform. This is done through Simple Power or EM Analysis (SPA/SEMA), or Differential Power or EM Analysis (DPA/DEMA) [22] . SPA/SEMA uses one signal trace and is the common approach [16, 24, 46] . DPA/DEMA uses thousands of traces and the statistical differences between them to extract information -typically cryptographic keys [22, 52] .
The timescales over which the signals are analyzed is determined by the information that attackers seek. For cryptographic keys, it is necessary to record and analyze signals over a few microseconds or faster [22] . For higher level information like the details of the running applications, keystrokes, browser data and personal information, signals are analyzed over timescales of milliseconds to seconds [24, 46, 48] . These attacks can be prevented by an OS-level defense, and we focus on them in this work. Figure 1 shows an example of SPA to identify program activity. Figure 1a is the power trace of a multithreaded application collected from an Intel Sandybridge processor running Linux. Figure 1b shows the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) of this signal, which reveals any repeating activity like loops. The FFT in Figure 1b has a single large peak (circled in the figure), indicating that the signal corresponds to only one single loop. The location of the peak gives the loop rate which is the inverse of the loop duration. It can be identified that the loop in Figure 1b runs for 15s (rate is 0.067Hz).
Example of Power Analysis
Notable peaks that occur at higher frequencies (e.g., at 0.25Hz and 0.45Hz) indicate repeating activity of groups of instructions. The noisiness of samples results in a tail of low magnitude values at even higher frequencies. Figure 1c shows the power trace for one loop, extracted from Figure 1a . Figure 1d shows the phases in the loop and the mean power values of each phase as found by a change point detection algorithm [27] . A phase is marked by a mean or variance that is different from samples before and after it. The algorithm detects 6 phases in the loop, including a short phase which is the transition between two major phases. The first two phases differ in their mean values, while the third and fourth differ in their variance. With a little additional knowledge of the power consumed by different operations on this platform [39] , the attacker can identify each phase's activity. For example, it is possible to label the five major phases in Figure 1d as memory accesses, multi-threaded array operations, single-thread computation with intermittent idleness, single-thread computation with frequent idleness and multi-threaded array operations, respectively.
Changing
Power and Temperature at the OS Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is a system input that changes the frequency and voltage of the processor's clock, and is widely available in many systems [4, 5, 9, 35, 36, 42] . DVFS levels can be set from the OS level, e.g., through cpufreq interfaces in Linux [12] . Typically, only the frequency is specified and the voltage value is automatically decided by the hardware. The power consumed by a computer system can be written as:
Therefore, changing DVFS levels has a dramatic effect on power. However, using DVFS alone to mask activity is not viable because of two reasons. First, systems support only a few DVFS levels and the achievable range of power cpnsumption depends on application activity. Compute-intensive phases have higher values of power and show bigger changes with DVFS while it is the opposite for IO or memory bound applications. Moreover, if DVFS alone is used to change power, the changing frequency values can be detected from a power signal using a high resolution oscilloscope [7, 8] or from the computer's EM emissions [2, 16] .
Another option to change power is to inject idle cycles into the system [23, 43] . In this method, a kernel driver launches high priority threads that only have idle activity, reducing cpu power. The amount of desired idle activity can be set as a percentage through sysfs interfaces. On linux, this is called powerclamp for Intel systems [43] , and has recently been extended to linux on ARM [23] . Unlike DVFS, idle cycle injection can only reduce power but cannot increase it.
Need for Intelligent Defenses
Attacks that use unprivileged hardware or OS counters to measure power or temperature may be stopped by removing application access to those counters. However, this does not prevent attackers from gathering measurements through EM emissions [16] , malicious charging stations, batteries or co-processing chips [24, 38, 48] .
A better solution is to intelligently manipulating the computer's power to prevent information leakage. Simplistic approaches like randomizing the DVFS levels are ineffective to meet this goal. From Equation 1, randomizing DVFS does not stop the impact of application activity on power. Figure 2a shows the power trace of a single loop iteration as in Figure 1c but with a randomly chosen DVFS value at every sample. This power trace is more noisy because of the changing DVFS levels but application activity is fully preserved including the difference in means and variances. Figure 2b shows that all five major phases are easily detected from this signal. Therefore, it is necessary to obfuscate the outputs like power by intelligently choosing the inputs, rather than randomly changing the inputs. 
Robust Control Theory
Robust control theory is an area focusing on controlling systems with only partial information about them [40] . Figure 3 shows a robust control loop. S is the system (e.g., a computer) and K is the robust controller. The system has outputs y (e.g., power consumed) and configurable inputs u (e.g., frequency). The outputs must be kept close to the output targets r . The controller reads the deviations of the outputs from their targets (∆y = r − y), and sets the inputs. Figure 3 . Robust control loop.
The controller operates as a state machine characterized by a state vector, x(T ), which is its accumulated experience that evolves over time T . The following equations show how it advances its state to x(T + 1) and generates the system inputs u(T ) by reading the output deviations ∆y(T ).
where A, B, C, and D are matrices that encode the controller. The robust controller K has special properties that are relevant for this work. First, robust controllers can set several inputs to meet several output targets simultaneously i.e., they are Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO). Second, designers can specify the maximum bounds on each of the output deviations. At runtime, the controller guarantees that the deviations are kept below these bounds.
Third, the controller can be built with only a partial model of the true system. All unmodeled behavior is considered "uncertainty", and designers specify the worst case impact of such uncertainty, called uncertainty guardband. E.g., a 50% margin means that the true system's outputs can be up to 50% different from what the model predicts. The controller guarantees to keep the output deviations within bounds even though it was built with inaccurate system information.
Finally, designers can also specify the relative overheads of each input as weights -i.e., a higher weight for an input results in smaller changes to that input.
Robust controller design is automated [18] . Designers provide a nominal model of the system that should be controlled, the output deviation bounds, uncertainty guardbands and input weights. Tools aid designers in setting all these parameters. Recently, robust control has been used in Yukta [32] , to co-design optimizing controllers for each layer in the computing stack (e.g., hardware and OS).
Maya: Protecting Against Power Analysis Attacks
The security of computers is at risk because of information leaked inadvertently through its physical side channels. Maya is an OS-level defense system that prevents information leakage by changing a computer's power. The key idea in Maya is simple -give the illusion of fake output activity by changing inputs intelligently. With Maya, a computer's power measurements still exhibit patterns, but which, are unrelated to the application. Therefore, signal analysis recovers only fake activity. Figure 4 shows the architecture of Maya in an OS that is running two regular applications, App1 and App2. Maya uses three logical modules -Mask Generator, Controller and Elastic Applications.
System Robust Controller

Inputs
Outputs Targets The Mask Generator decides how the output signals must appear i.e., the target values for the outputs. A controller reads these targets and the actual output measurements from sensor drivers. It changes the execution parameters or inputs to keep the outputs close to the targets. Some of these inputs like DVFS are hardware related and are handled by appropriate drivers. The others are sent to Elastic applications that can increase or decrease their power consumption based on a configurable parameter. We describe each component next.
Mask Generator
The Mask Generator decides how the outputs must appear so that their analysis would reveal only artificial activity instead of the application's activity. Recall from Section 2.1.2 that this can be accomplished by falsifying the time-domain and frequency-domain (i.e., after FFT) behavior of the outputs.
For effective falsification, the output targets must have certain properties. The mean and variance of the targets must change over time to portray phase behavior. These changes must have various rates -from smooth to abrupt so that output variations generated natively by the application will be indistinguishable from the artificially induced changes. This condition is equivalent to requiring the FFT of the targets to be spread over a range of frequencies. Finally, the targets must have repeating patterns at various rates to alter the peaks detected from the FFT. Table 1 lists well-known waveforms and their viability to be used as targets. The table also lists if the target is amenable to generate changing mean, variance, FFT peak locations, and if the FFT is spread over a range of rates. A constant target does not show changes in mean or variance. Its FFT has a single peak that occurs at 0 Hz, indicating no change. Ideally, this is the perfect target to use but its properties cannot be realized in practice. Any realistic method of keeping outputs fixed under changing conditions would have to first observe the outputs deviating from the targets and then set the inputs accordingly. This leaves a burst of power activity at all natural changepoints in the application.
In Uniformly Random, a value is chosen randomly from a range and is used as a target for a random duration. After this period, another value and duration are selected and the process repeats. This signal creates changing mean levels but there is no variance within a period. The signal's FFT is spread across a range but has no peaks. Therefore, any repeating activity in the application can potentially show up in the FFT.
Gaussian Noise chooses a target value from a Gaussian distribution. Changing the mean and standard deviation of the distribution results in changing mean and variance of the target signal. Moreover, its FFT is uniformly spread making it an attractive choice from a time-domain perspective. However, this signal does not have peaks in the FFT, as with Uniformly Random targets.
A Sinusoid waveform generates a sinusoid target with a given amplitude, offset and frequency. By changing these parameters it can induce changes to the signal mean and variance. The sinusoid clear sharp peak in its FFT at each of its frequencies but there is no spread. Therefore, this waveform is not effective at masking abrupt changes in the outputs.
Finally, Noisy Sinusoid is the addition of a Sinusoid and Gaussian Noise with all the desirable properties we want. The mean, variance and FFT peak locations can be varied by changing the parameters of the sinusoid. The Gaussian noise spreads the FFT widening the sinusoid's peak. Therefore, we design the the Mask Generator to issue Noisy Sinusoids as targets for each output, and change the offset, amplitude, frequency and noise of the targets dynamically. Figure 5 shows a target following this waveform and its FFT. Figure 5a also shows the phases that would be detected from this pattern. Figure 5 . A Noisy Sinusoid target pattern and its FFT.
Controller
The Controller finds the input values to keep the outputs close to the targets. It reads the targets from the Mask Generator and the actual output measurements from sensor drivers. We design the controller with MIMO Robust control theory [40] . The Controller finds the inputs using Equation 2 and its working is described in Section 2.4. Robust control theory is the enabling technology for Maya. Being MIMO, the controller can simultaneously change the multiple inputs in our design to keep all outputs close to their targets.
Robust controllers also guarantee that the deviations of outputs from their targets are always kept below designer specified bounds. This is essential for Maya to effectively manipulate the information revealed by output analysis. With non-robust control, it is difficult to make the outputs accurately follow their targets. Consequently, the outputs cannot mislead signal analysis.
The controller's robustness allows Maya to work across applications that differ in their activity profile and response to inputs. Non-robust controllers fail to accuractely follow the targets when runtime conditions differ from the information used in its design. In contrast, robust controllers are designed with uncertainty guardbands (Section 2.4) and can accurately track the targets as long as the runtime response of the system is within the guardband [40] . Fortunately, these guardbands can be large without slowing the controller [40] .
Elastic Applications
The Elastic applications serve as inputs in addition to DVFS and idle cycle injection (Section 2.2). They take in one or more runtime parameters and vary their power consumption from a minimum level (i.e., sleep) to maximum power. The elastic applications are pacakged with Maya and can interrupt the regular applications.
The elastic applications enable Maya overcome three problems. First, there is a lack of OS level inputs that can reliably change power across a large range. Options like DVFS or idle cycle injection work well in only some cases (Section 2.2).
Without reliable actuators, a computer's power cannot be changed, leaving it vulnerable to information leakage. The elastic applications address this limitation.
Second, if DVFS alone is used to change power, attackers can detect the change in the frequency by measuring the computer's EM emissions [2, 16] or by reading power through a high resolution oscilloscope [7, 8] . Once the frequency is determined, it is possible to re-scale the power trace. Using the elastic applications apart from DVFS prevents this because power changes can be triggered from multiple inputs now.
Finally, by working as actuators at the software level, the elastic applications allow Maya to be deployed on many existing systems without needing extra hardware support.
Deploying Maya
Maya is intended to be deployed as a part of the OS, requiring administrative privileges to interact with the sensor and input drivers . Maya can be considered to be similar to power governors in linux [12] . Therefore, applications can request Maya to be active only when it is necessary to perform security-sensitive operations on their systems. In such cases, Maya will start when any application triggers it and stop only after all applications issue stop requests.
The Mask Generator and Controller run periodically while the Elastic applications run always. These applications are also run with administrative privileges and cannot be modified from user space.
Security Boundaries
Maya assumes that the OS is uncompromised, and the hardware implements DVFS faithfully. Currently, the processor's frequency is visible to users, e.g., through the cpufreq interfaces in linux. This information must now be privileged.
Under these conditions, it can outsmart several types of attacks -those that measure power from OS and hardware counters [1, 36] , or snooping hardware like USB charging stations [48] , smart batteries [24] , or co-processing chips and IP modules [38] . Even in scenarios where the attacker has physical access to the computer and runs a victim application many times [22] , Maya presents a different output waveform each time as long as the OS is intact.
In multicores, Maya also misleads power and thermal covert channels [20, 26] because the power activity of the cores is distorted.
Implementing Maya on Two Systems
We implement Maya on two systems. System One is a consumer class machine with 6 cores from the Intel Sandybridge generation. Each core supports 2 hardware contexts, totaling 12 logical cores at the OS level. System Two is a server class machine with 2 sockets, each having 10 cores of 2 hardware contexts -a total of 40 logical cores.
On both systems, the processors are from the Intel Sandybridge generation. The OS is CentOS 7.6, based on the linux kernel version 3.10. We consider one output on each system: total chip power, measured in watts. There are three inputs in the system: DVFS, percentage of idle cycle injection and one elastic power application.
DVFS values can be changed from 1.2 GHz to 2.0 GHz on System One and from 1.2 GHz to 2.6 GHz on System Two, with 0.1 GHz increments in either case. On both systems, idle activity can be set from 0% to 48% in steps of 4%, and the configurable parameter for the elastic application can vary from 0 to 20 in steps of 2.
Power consumption is measured through RAPL interfaces [31] which update their counters every millisecond. DVFS is set using cpufreq interfaces and idle activity is specified through Intel's powerclamp interface [43] . The configurable parameter for the elastic application is set through an shm file.
The Elastic applications, Controller and Mask Generator run as privileged processes on both machines. We describe the design details of each component next. To prove the effectiveness of Maya, we deploy Maya with the same components on both systems. Add a third system -odroid.
Designing the Power Elastic application
We use one elastic application to change the computer's power. This application is multithreaded and runs floating point array operations mixed with sleep cycles. It changes its power consumption by changing the number of active threads and sleep cycles. It reads a parameter whose value ranges between 0 and 20.
Designing the Controller
The Controller is developed from robust control theory. To design it, we need (i) a dynamic model of the system (i.e., the computer running an application), and set (ii) set the output deviation bounds, uncertainty guardbands and input weights [40] .
For the model, we use the experimental modeling methodology of the System Identification approach [25] . In this approach, we run training applications on the system and, during execution, change the system inputs. We log the observed outputs and the inputs. From the data, we construct a dynamic polynomial model of the system:
In this equation, y(T) and u(T) denote the outputs and inputs at time T. This model describes outputs at any time as a function of the m past outputs, and the current and n-1 past inputs. The constants a i and b i are obtained by least squares minimization from the experimental data [25] .
We perform system identification by running the swaptions application from the PARSEC 3.0 benchmark suite [11] on System One. The models we obtain have a dimension of 4 i.e., m = n = 4 in Equation 3. The system identification approach is powerful to capture the relationship between the inputs and outputs with only small data.
We need to specify the input weights, uncertainty guardbands and output deviation bounds to design the Controller with automated tools [18] . The input weights are set depending on the relative overhead of changing that input. In our system, all inputs have similar overheads and we set all the input weights to 1.
Next, we specify the uncertainty guardbands by evaluating several choices. For each choice, tools like Matlab [18] give the smallest output deviation bounds the controller can provide. We finally set the guardband to be 40$ which is the largest value that allows output deviation bounds for power to be within 10%. This means that the controller can keep the output deviations within 10% even if the runtime output response is up to 40% different from what the model predicts.
With the model and these specifications, standard tools [18] generate the set of matrices that encode the robust controller (Section 2.4). The Controller periodically runs every 20 ms. We set this duration based on the update rate of the sensors, and latencies of input changes.
We use the same controller on Systems One and Two. Thanks to the fast action of the robust controller, the outputs converge to any given target in 3 samples on both machines.
Mask Generator
The Mask Generator uses a Noisy Sinusoid to provide the targets for each output. This signal is a sum of a sinusoid and Gaussian noise:
The Mask Generator induces false phases by changing the parameters Offset, Amp, Freq, µ and σ . Each of these parameter is selected at random from a range of values. Offset, Amp and µ are selected from [0, T DP 2 ] where TDP is the Thermal Design Power of the system i.e., the maximum power that the system can dissipate. Freq and σ correspond to changing variances and are chosen from [ T DP 30 , T DP 10 ]. Values in the targets are clipped between 0 and TDP before they are issued to the controller.
Once a particular set of parameters are chosen, the Mask Generator provides the targets using them for a duration of N hold samples, after which the parameters are updated again. N hold itself varies randomly between 6 to 120 samples.
The Mask Generator is also triggered periodically, at every 60 ms i.e., for every 3 invocations of the Controller.
Experimental Methodology
We deploy Maya on Systems One and Two that are described in Section 4. In both cases, Maya uses the same components. We evaluate several alternative methods to distort a computer's power, and compare their effectiveness using multiple metrics. We list them next.
Metrics for Evaluation
The metrics we use to evaluate the similarity between a morphed power signal and the unmodified baseline signal are: Warped signal correlation: This metric utilizes Dynamic Time Warping (DTW), a well-known method to make signals similar even when one of them has values that are missing or shifted relative to the other signal [30] . DTW on a pair of signals repeats the samples in each signal as many times as necessary so that the adjusted signals resemble each other closely. Since the samples in each signal can be repeated arbitrary number of times, DTW is an oracle-like technique to make signals look similar. The correlation coefficients between the original and adjusted signals are a measure of the modification necessary to match the signals.
We first pass the baseline and morphed power signals through a low-pass filter to remove sample noise and define their warped signal correlation (Corr war p ) as follows:
Corr war p = Corr (B, B ad just ed ) + Corr ( M, M ad just ed ) 2 (5) where B is the baseline signal and M is the morphed signal. Corr (B, B ad just ed ) is the correlation coefficient between B and its adjusted version while Corr ( M, M ad just ed ) is the correlation coefficient between M and its adjusted version. Corr war p values close to 0 indicate that the baseline and morphed signals have to be extensively adjusted if they are to be made similar while values near 1 indicate that the signals are naturally similar to each other. Correlation of phase means: This is the correlation coefficient between the phases detected in the power signals with and without Maya. To obtain this metric, we first extract the phases in the baseline and morphed signals as described in Section 2. 
Constant
Uniform Gaussian Noise Sinusoid Noisy Sinusoid Figure 7 . Comparing warped signal correlation between the outputs generated by Maya using various methods and the baseline power signal on System Two. Lower values indicate more differences over the unmodified signal.
difference between the corresponding peak locations tells how different the FFTs are.
Scenarios Evaluated
We divide our evaluation in three parts. First, we evaluate the effectiveness of Maya in masking the activity of conventional applications from the PARSEC 3.0 and SPLASH2x benchmark suites [11] . Second, we evaluate a special case where attackers can measure power faster than the decision intervals in Maya, and another case when the same application is run multiple times. In the third part, we evaluate Maya to hide intermittent activity noticed in browsers and keystrokes. Sensitivity: Change sampling (and control) intervals from 5, 10, 40 100 and 200 ms, robust controller/mask generator parameters.
Mask Generation Methods Compared
We evaluate the different target generation methods listed in Table 1 . These are Constant targets, Uniformly Random, Gaussian Noise, Sinusoid and Noisy Sinusoid signals, as described in Section 3.1.
Evaluation
We present our evaluation in three parts: (i) full applications from PARSEC and SPLASH2x, (ii) evaluating Maya under special environments, and (iii) browser and keystroke applications. Figures 6 and 7 show the warped signal correlation of Maya with various mask generation methods on System One and System Two respectively. In the charts, each application has multiple bars, one for each mask generation method. The average across all applications is at the rightmost end.
Part 1: Evaluating full applications
Comparing Warped Signal Correlation
On both systems, the average warped signal correlation for all methods is much below 1, indicating that they make the power signal to be quite different from the baseline. Recall that DTW is an oracle-like technique to make two signals appear similar. A low warped signal correlation indicates that Maya is able to make the baseline and morphed signals different. For reference, the warped signal correlation between the baseline power traces of two unrelated applications, blackscholes from PARSEC (p.bla) and water_spatial from SPLASH2x (s.ws) is 0.43 (not shown in the figure). Figure 10 shows the power traces of the blackscholes application from the Baseline and with Maya using Noisy Sinusoid mask, before and after DTW. The top charts show the traces after the signals are passed through a low pass filter to remove noise and the bottom charts show the adjusted signals after DTW so that they match closely. It can be seen that DTW had to alter the signals significantly to make them match closely. Consequently, the warped signal correlation for this pair is 0.17, which is a low value. For more insight, Figure 11 shows the power trace of the blackscholes application on System Two in the baseline design and with each of the methods. The figure also shows the detected mean levels of the signals. In the baseline (Figure 11(a) ), the application has three major phases: singlethread, multi-thread and single-thread. Figure 11b shows the power trace with a Constant mask. There is a noticeable transition at 20 s, when the application changes from single-thread to multi-thread execution. A constant target does not induce artificial changes in the means and variance of the outputs. Therefore, any variations observed in the power trace are directly related to the application, rendering obfuscaton ineffective..
Comparing Correlation of Means
The remaining methods issue targets that mislead the analysis algorithm into recovering false phases and means. It can be seen that Noisy Sinusoid (Figure 11(f) ) has the most noisy profile.
Difference in FFT Peak Locations
This metric captures the average difference, in percentage, between the locations of peaks in the FFT of the morphed signals and the peak locations in the baseline signal. We consider the top three peaks in each FFT and use the average of their difference from the baseline peak locations. Figures 12 and 13 this metric for different methods on System One and System Two respectively. The vertical axis on these charts is on a logarithmic scale. Figures 12 and 13 show that the peak locations in the morphed signals through various masks differ, on an average, by nearly 100% from those in the baseline. For more insight, Figure 14 shows the FFT of the power trace from blackscholes on System Two with baseline and Maya with various masks. Figure 14a is the FFT of the power trace from the baseline execution. Figure 14b shows the FFT with a constant target. This FFT carries a similar peak at high frequency similar to the Baseline indicating that sharp changes in the baseline are still preserved.
Uniform (Figure 14c ) and Gaussian (Figure 14d ) have similar but noisier fourier transforms as the baseline. They do not preserve the high frequency changes in the Baseline. Sinusoid (Figure 14e ) has additional peaks it introduces but these peaks are not spread-out causing them to be detected as outliers in the FFT. Noisy Sinusoid (Figure 14f ) is visibly different from the Baseline FFT. It is noisy and has multiple additional peaks that are spread over a range of frequencies. Therefore, it offers the best obfuscation. two respectively. The values are normalized to the baseline execution time. All methods are slower than the baseline execution because they do not let the application run at the power level it needs. Using constant targets results in the longest execution times because applications must always operate with lower power than they need. 
Performance Overheads
Overall Remarks
Across all metrics, Noisy Sinusoid, the method used in Maya to shape a computer's power is effective. It has low correlation with the baseline signal, morphing both the time-domain and frequency-domain properties of the computer's power. Therefore, analyzing these signals would reveal incorrect activity as opposed to application activity. Maya worked effectively without any changes on two different systems demonstrating its effectiveness and ease of deployment on existing computers.
Evaluating Maya in Special Scenarios
We consider two special scenarios to demonstrate the abilities of Maya. One is the case where the same application is run multiple times. The other is when the attacker can measure the power trace at a faster rate than the controller decision interval in Maya.
Repeated Runs of the Same application
Maya does not generate the same or similar waveform for a given application because the Mask Generator's patterns are uncorrelated with the system outputs and application activity. To demonstrate this, Figure 17 shows the power traces of the baseline and obfuscated power traces of vips with four runs of Maya. Each power trace and the detected phases are clearly different confirming that Maya's behavior is not related with the application being protected.
Related Work
Power, temperature and EM emissions from a computer are an important set of physical side channels, and have been used by many attackers to identify sensitive data [22, 52, 53] . Kocher et al [22] give a detailed overview of attacks exploiting power signals with Simple Power analysis (SPA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). They also present how the full encryption key of a cryptosystem could be extracted using power signals.
Michalevsky et al developed a malicious smartphone application that could track the location of a user without reading GPS. Instead, it uses power measured through unprivileged OS counters. Yan et al develop a similar application that identifies the running application, the specific GUI of the application (like a login window), and the length of keystrokes that have been pressed by the user [46] . Lifshits et al could additionally predict the characters typed in each keystroke and user's personal information like browser, camera and location activity [24] . Yang user's browser activity.Schellenberg et al could measure a chip's power from a malicious chip on board [38] . Power, temperature and EM emissions are correlated, attackers have used temperature and EM measurements to identify application activity [2, 14, 16, 17, 19, 45] . These attacks have targeted many environments like smart cards, mobile systems, laptops and IoT devices. Recently, Masti et al showed how temperature can be used to identify another core's activity in multicores [26] . Temperature can also be used as a proxy for power measurements. This broadens the threat from physical side channels because attackers can read EM signals even from a distance, or measure temperature through co-location even when the system does not support power counters.
Several countermeasures against power side channels have been proposed [7, 15, 22, 37, 41, 49, 50, 52] . They usually operate along one of two principles -keep power changes invariant to mask any activity [15, 33, 37, 41, 51] , or, make power consumption noisy such that the impact of application activity is lost [22, 52] . A common approach is to randomize DVFS using special hardware [7, 49, 49] . Avirneni and Somani also propose new circuits for randomizing DVFS but change voltage and frequency independently [7] .
Baddam and Zwolinski showed that randomizing DVFS is not a viable defense because attackers can identify clock frequency changes through high resolution power traces [8] . Yang et al proposed using random task scheduling at the OS level in addition to new hardware for randomly setting the processor frequency and clock phase [47] . Real et al show that simple approaches of introducing noise or empty activity into the system can be filtered out.
Trusted execution environments like Intel SGX [28] or ARM Trustzone [6] can provide isolation with only shared resources at the hardware and software. They do not establish boundaries for physical signals. Blinking is an approach where a circuit is temporarily shielded from the outside and is run with a small amount of energy stored inside it [3] . During this period, the circuit is fully isolated from outside.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first OS-level defense against physical side channels. It does not need new hardware support to provide its security benefits and can be easily deployed on existing systems.
Conclusions
Physical outputs like power, temperature and electromagnetic (EM) emissions carry application information and are a security vulnerability in many environments. Existing countermeasures need new hardware and do not address the security of billions of devices in operation today. This work described Maya, an OS-level defense against power side channels that can be easily deployed on existing systems. Maya intelligently modifies a computer's power to portray false activity. It introduces software-level actuators called elastic applications and uses robust control theory. We implemented Maya on two different platforms, without having to customize Maya's components for each platform and showed that it is very effective in falsifying application activity.
